1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Several recent papers have argued that investor overconfidence or shifts in confidence offer a possible explanation for a range of anomalous empirical patterns in securities markets. 1 An important general objection to such approaches is that rational traders ought to make profits at the expense of the irrational ones, so that irrationality should in the long run be eliminated as as i g n i ficant factor in the market.
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This paper offers a new reason for the possible long-run survival of overconfident traders in competition with rational traders. The basic idea is that risk averse, overconfident traders trade more aggressively based on valid information than do rational traders. As a result, overconfident traders are better able to exploit risky profit opportunities created by the trades of liquiditymotivated traders or the mistakes of noise traders. 3 Overconfident investors 1 Odean (1998) examines investor overconfidence, overreactions, and the high volume of trade in securities markets. Subrahmanyam (1998, 2000) examine the consistency of overconfidence and shifts in confidence with abnormal post-event returns in event studies, short horizon stock price momentum, long run reversal, short-versus longhorizon correlations between accounting performance and later stock price performance, and the relative ability of size, fundamental/price ratios, and risk measures to predict future returns. Odean (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) also examine conditions under which there will be excess or insufficient volatility of security returns relative to a rational benchmark.
2 Luo (1998) provides a model of natural selection in which irrational traders lose money and the market evolves toward long run efficiency. Also, Figlewski (1978 Figlewski ( , 1982 finds that owing to wealth shifts among traders with diverse information, informational efficiency may or may not be achievable depending on the correlation of signals received by the traders and depending on the degree of traders' risk aversion. 3 Apart from this informational benefit, overconfident investors who underestimate risk can potentially benefit from exploiting the risk premium on a positive net supply risky asset (i.e., investing heavily in the 'market portfolio'). This non-informational effect was noted previously in DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990), discussed below. We rule out this effect by assuming here that the risky security is in zero net supply. 1 trade aggressively both because they underestimate risk and because they overestimate the conditional expected value from their trading strategies.
Since the information they exploit is valid, their more aggressive use of it (either long or short on the risky asset) causes them to earn higher expected profits (though lower expected utility). Their expected profits are limited by the fact that if there are too many overconfident traders, or if their confidence is too extreme, their trading pushes price against them excessively.
Rational traders then profit by trading in opposition to overconfident traders.
If trader types replicate according to the profitability of their strategies, we show that overconfident traders survive in the long run, and can even drive out rational traders completely.
Several authors, beginning with De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990, 1991) , have offered other distinct arguments as to why imperfectly rational traders, including overconfident ones, may survive in the long run.
4 De Long et al (1991) examine traders who are overconfident in the sense that they underestimate risk. As a result of underestimating risk, these traders hold more of the risky asset (e.g., the market portfolio). Since the risky asset earns higher expected return, these traders can do well relative to rational traders.
Our approach differs from De Long et al (1991) in the following respects. In contrast with the commitment approach of these papers, in our model traders are perfectly competitive. Traders observe the market price and take it as given. Thus, a trader does not limit the size of his position out of fear that an overconfident informed trader will trade intensely in the same direction. The benefittooverconfidence in our model is that overconfident traders are willing to take on more risk, and hence better exploit the mispricing generated by the trades of 'noise' or liquidity traders. Unlike the commitment approach discussed above, in our model this benefit applies even if there is only a very small measure of informed traders. In other words, the profits arise not from the commitment to be aggressive (and the desirable effects of such commitment upon the behavior of other traders), but directly from the aggressiveness of the trading strategy. 
The Static Model
Consider a one-period competitive market consisting of two types of securities, a risk-free security with a constant payoff equal to one, and a risky security with a payoff equal to θ,w h e r eθ is a normally distributed random variable with mean θ and variance σ gain derived from the two types of assets. Since the payoff of the risk-free
The expected profit for both types of traders is a function of the variance of the risky asset's payoff, the variance of noise trading, the variance of the signal perceived by the rational traders, the variance of the signal perceived by the overconfident traders, the degree of risk aversion and the relative size of overconfident traders to the rational traders.
The difference in the expected profits for both types of traders is shown to be 
, and λ t ∈ (0, 1),
T h ea b o v ec l a s so fd y n a m i c si sg e n e r a lenough to encompass standard ones such as replicator dynamics and many other types of selection dynamics used in evolutionary game theory (see Taylor and Jonker (1978) , Weibull (1995) ).
It is similar to that used by Luo (1999) . The dynamic equilibrium is defined to be either an interior fixed point (case (i) above) or a corner solution (case (iii) or case (v) above) of the above dynamics. We denote the dynamic equilibrium as λ.
4R e s u l t s
This section relates the long-run proportion of surviving overconfident traders to the underlying parameters of the model, such as the degree of overconfidence, noise volatility, and the volatility of underlying security payoffs. The equilibrium has the following properties: 
Proposition 1 F o ra l lp o s i t i v ep a r a m e t e rv a l u e s( a, σ
(i) If a 2 σ 2 x σ 2 c σ 2 θ <σ 2 − σ 2 c , then the dynamic equilibrium is the interior fixed point where λ =1− a 2 σ 2 x σ 2 c σ 2 θ σ 2 −σ 2 c . (ii) If a 2 σ 2 x σ 2 c σ 2 θ ≥ σ 2 − σ
( v i )T h eg r e a t e rt h ec o n fidence of the overconfident traders, the lower is the
proportion that survive in the equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix
We now comment on the results in order:
c , then for all positive parameters, no matter where λ t starts in the interval (0, 1), it evolves into the interior fixed point where the rational traders and the overconfident traders coexist. Thus, so long as there is some liquidity/noise trading, and overconfidence is not too severe, the overconfident traders will persist in the long run. Intuitively, overconfident traders place greater weight on the signal optimistically, and therefore take a bigger (or more risky) position and better exploit the misvaluation created by liquidity/noise traders than do rational traders. Consequently, overconfident traders survive in the long run. However, if there are too many overconfident traders, the prices would be pushed against them excessively and rational traders would gain at the expense of overconfident traders by trading in the opposite direction to the overconfident traders. Hence, the rational traders survive in the long run as well. 
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(iv) The higher is the volatility coming from the underlying security payoff, the larger is the proportion of surviving overconfident traders.
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As volatility of the underlying security payoff increases, rational traders are not able to infer as clearly that a high price indicates overvaluation. This increases the riskiness for them of a contrarian strategy of selling when price is high and buying when price is low. The perceived risk of this strategy is reduced by observation of the private information signal, but this perceived risk reduction is greater for the overconfident. As a result, higher volatility of underlying security payoff increases the relative expected profitability for the overconfident. (v) As the volatility of liquidity/noise trading increases, the equilibrium proportion of overconfident traders increases as well. Noise creates misvaluation, which offers greater profit opportunities for overconfident traders than 10 In this model, liquidity/noise trading is constant through time (i.e., σ x is constant and positive). We do not apply a selection dynamic to such traders because the inclusion of such traders implicitly reflects the notion that many or even all individuals are subject to shocks in the need for cash for consumption purposes. However, an alternative perspective is that there are traders who trade in a random independent fashion. In some settings such traders can make money (see DeLong et al (1990 DeLong et al ( , 1991 ), but in others they are eventually eliminated (see Luo (1998) ). The long-run performance of such traders also depends on the degree of the traders' risk aversion and the correlation of the signals received by traders (see Figlewski (1978) ). Even if there is economic natural selection against noise trading,for fully rational ones. Figure 1 
5C o n c l u s i o n
Recent research has proposed several ways in which overconfident traders can persist despite competition from rational traders. This paper offers an additional reason: overconfident traders do better than purely rational traders at exploiting misvaluation caused by liquidity or noise trading. Using a model of a perfectly competitive asset market involving rational traders, overconfident traders and liquidity/noise traders, we examine both the static profitability of overconfident versus rational trading strategies, and the dynamic evolution of the population of traders. Different investor types are assumed to become more prevalent when their strategies are more profitable.
In some cases there is an interior equilibrium with both rational and overconfident traders. If the degree of risk aversion, the volatility of liquidity/noise trading or the volatility of the underlying security payoff becomes sufficiently large, rational traders are driven out of the market and only overconfident traders survive. The higher the noise volatility and the higher the volatility of the underlying security payoff, the larger is the proportion of 15 surviving overconfident traders. The more intense is their confidence, the lower is the proportion of surviving overconfident traders. Finally, our main result is that unless the degree of overconfidence is infinite, the long-run steady-state equilibrium always involves overconfident traders surviving as a positive fraction of the population. Figure 1 The relationship between the surviving overconfident traders and either volatility or noise Figure 2 The relationship between the surviving overconfident traders and overconfidence level
